Reform agenda

AUG 08 -

In 2009, the Maoist decision to dismiss the Army chief with implications for the future chain of command led to the collapse of the Prachanda-led government. This time around, the party has learnt a lesson and been extra cautious in designating the senior most officer in the Army as the next chief. General Gaurav Shumsher Rana will take over as the leader of Nepal’s arguably strongest institution in a quiet and relatively controversy-free context.

But that hides the real behind-the-scenes story of the past two years where both he and his colleague and competitor Lt Gen Nepal Bhushan Chand engaged extensively with the political class and the international community for this moment. Rana pitched for protecting the existing chain of command and ensuring the seniority principle was followed, which would automatically elevate him to the top post. Chand projected himself as the more competent and banked on the fact that it was ultimately the discretion of the government of the day.

A particularly tense period for both was during the Jhalanath Khanal government when General Chattraman Gurung delayed Rana’s promotion. This was the Army chief’s decision, but it gave Chand hope that if Rana and he were promoted from major generals at the same time, the seniority argument would get diluted. Fortunately for Rana, the Cabinet of the day promoted him first and, only after a gap, took the decision in the case of Chand and kept with the prior chain of command. 

The possible elevation of Major General Daman Ghale, by creating an additional position through NA restructuring, was also keenly followed by the two officers for its possible implications for their own prospects. Eventually, the restructuring plan did not come through. On the morning he returned after a retreat at Nagarkot in early June, the PM told Rana that he would be the next chief. The government had clearly decided to play safe and go by past practice on seniority. Rana had been a competent officer all along, and there were no taints against him to undermine his claims either.

Chand would be disappointed. But to his credit, he emerges with his dignity intact. He neither went around willing to compromise on the Army’s “interests” to fulfill his personal ambition nor has he reacted rashly to the government’s decision. While Chand will be expected to follow his new boss, Rana would do well to reach out and treat his colleague with respect.

The episode illustrates the worrying, and growing, tendency where contenders for such high “apolitical” offices have to adopt various means to curry favour with political bosses. Flattered, and sensing an opportunity to score political advantages, party leaders play along—with little thought for what the practice does for larger culture of public institutions. But this is not unique, for in India too—with its long history of institutions—hectic lobbying occurs to rise to the top.  What is unique in Nepal, though, is that once the appointment happens, especially in the case of the Army chief, politicians begin lobbying with him to solicit support for their political line.

General Rana takes over at a time of a constitutional breakdown and political crisis. He will no doubt fulfill the routine responsibilities that come with his office. But three issues—how he navigates the political terrain, wraps up integration and addresses the NA reform agenda of inclusion and rightsizing—will be important during his tenure.

The first is tied to the Army’s role in the current context. Some sections of the loony royalist right would be hoping that the Army will bat for the former monarch in his comeback attempts. This seems more fantasy than reality. More seriously, though, some section of the political spectrum, especially the NC and UML right wing, want the President—with the Army’s support—to be assertive and establish authority. The President appears to be getting restive, but has not indulged in any adventurism yet. This is wise, for any unilateral move on his part will create a new polarisation and conflict, and damage the republican foundations itself.

Whatever his personal views about various political formations, Rana, too, would be well advised to follow the course of restraint. Society is polarised, newer forces are asserting themselves, older forces are resisting change and the polity reflects all those tendencies. Fortunately, politicians are talking and not killing each other. Eventually, they will have to find a compromise, for the balance of power is such that no force can do things its own way, sidelining the others. There may be a yearning for strongman rule and political order among a section of the population, but that is neither possible, nor will it offer a solution which will emerge from the messy, noisy, chaotic political process of negotiation itself. The most helpful thing the NA can do—both for the country and in its own self-interest—is remain out and not try to influence the political outcome.

The second immediate challenge is facilitating the integration process, which is stuck on age issue with combatants providing separate dates of birth during the UN verification process and in their citizenship certificates acquired after the war. Education, too, remains a sticking point. This will have to be settled at the political level through the Special Committee when it eventually meets; the secretariat has some compromise formulations on the contentious issues. The NA says it is going by the 7-point agreement and will follow any political deal on the matter. But it could nudge the actors into doing so swiftly. The integration process is no threat to NA’s structure anymore; so being flexible and getting it over with would be a valuable contribution to the peace process.

The third medium-term challenge for the NA is that instead of dismissing any criticism to be “anti-Army”, it should address issues related to institutional reform. As long Madhesis remain so grossly under-represented, a large section of the population will not be able to own the institution and instead perceive it as an alien force. No rationalisation works with young radical Madhesis, and making it more inclusive should be a key priority. In a contradiction of sorts, while adding numbers, the NA needs to make a plan for its eventual downsizing—something which even senior generals agree with.

General Rana has an illustrious family legacy. How he combines his traditional background, with the contemporary needs of the Nepal Army in the wider changing political and social context, will shape the nature of his tenure.

Source: http://www.ekantipur.com/2012/08/08/oped/reform-agenda/358438/